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THE MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY AND
SECURITIES FRAUD LIABILITY; ITS DAYS
ARE NUMBERED*
INTRODUCTION
Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution empow-
ers Congress to regulate the "channels and instrumentalities" of
interstate commerce, 2 as well as activities which possess a sub-
stantial economic relation to interstate commerce. 3 This Con-
gressional power is valid, as long as it does not substantially in-
fringe upon the sovereignty of the states. 4
* "For PaPa"
1 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. The Federal Constitution provides in relevant
part:
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises,
to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defense and general Welfare of the
United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the
United States; Cl. 18 To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for car-
rying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Con-
stitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
thereof.
Id.
2 See Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 323 (1903) (prohibiting lottery ticket trans-
portation across state borders is within Congressional power and not within state's police
powers); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 170 (1868) (ruling that insurance policies do not
constitute interstate commerce). See generally Nathan v. Louisiana, 49 U.S. 73, 73 (1850)
(holding Bills of Exchange are not interstate commerce).
3 See Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1, 10 (1936) (articulating constitutional objections to
SEC Acts); Garfield v. United States ex rel. Goldsby, 211 U.S. 249, 262 (1908) (discussing
how there is no room in our governmental system for arbitrary imposition of power);
United States v. Detroit & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 338 (1906) (documenting delinea-
tion between courts and departmental administration offices); Noble v. Union River
Logging R.R. Co., 147 U.S. 165, 171 (1893) (issuing injunction to prevent public officers
from unlawfully assuming power over interstate property).
4 See Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 657 (1975) (documenting availability
of Privileges and Immunities and Commerce Clause together in Articles of Confedera-
tion); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 170 (1968) (stating, "Indeed without some provision of
some kind removing from the citizens of each state the disabilities of alienage in the
other states, and giving them equality of privilege with those states ... [i]t would not have
constituted the union which now exists" (quoting Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n of
Montana, 436 U.S. 377, 380 (1978))); Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. 418, 422 (1870)
(explaining how separation of Privilege and Immunities Clause and Commerce Clause
was done in anticipation of potential of narrow reading); cf. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38
U.S. 519, 579 (1839) (documenting state authority with respect to corporate restructur-
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Congress exercised its interstate commerce authority by em-
powering the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") with
rule-making authority after the stock market crash of 1929.5 In
order to curtail rampant fraudulent investing practices and pro-
tect the securities market, it was imperative for the SEC to enact
regulatory provisions. 6 The SEC, in developing the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 ("'34 Act"), has taken an aggressive stance
in combating fraudulent investing practices. 7 For example, pur-
suant to its rule-making authority under Section 10(b) of the '34
Act, the SEC promulgated Rule 10b-5 as the principal weapon
against insider trading. Specifically, Rule 10b-5 serves as the
primary regulatory tool upon which criminal liability for securi-
ties fraud may be premised.
Recently in United States v. O'Hagan,8 the Supreme Court
analyzed the SEC's regulatory anti-fraud provisions. 9 The Su-
ing); Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (1824) (describing interstate commerce of nations,
between nations, and parts of nations).
5 See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1998) (codifying regulatory tools for criminal liability of se-
curities fraud); see also Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226 (1980) (enumerating
Commission's power to regulate manipulative trading (citing Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 202 (1976))); SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 450 (9th Cir. 1990)
(explaining how regulatory tools are designed (citing S. REP. No. 73-792, 6 (1934))). But
see Marc Mellett, Comment, Is there Life After Bryan?: The Validity of Rule lOb-5's Mis-
appropriation Theory, 34 DUQ. L. REV. 1057, 1072 (1996) (demonstrating need for alter-
nate means upon which securities fraud may be predicated).
6 See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). Section 10(b) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality, or interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any na-
tional securities exchange...
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security regis-
tered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any ma-
nipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
Id.; see also Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3230, 7 Fed. Reg. at 3804 (May 21,
1942). This release explains why fraudulent investor practices should be curtailed. Id.
7 See 15 U.S.C. § 78j. Rule lOb-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality, or interstate commerce or of the mails or of any facility of any na-
tional securities exchange,(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,(b)
To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statement made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in any act, practice, or
course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
8 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997).
9 Id. at 2199 (convicting defendant of illegally misappropriating securities informa-
tion). See United States v. Cusimano, 123 F.3d 83, 87 (2d Cir. 1997) (discussing violation
of Rule 10b-5 as involving possession of material, non-public information gained in viola-
THE MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY
preme Court held the "misappropriation theory"'10 of liability as
the proper means by which one may impose criminal liability
under Rule 10b-5 of the '34 Act. 1'
This Note focuses upon the Supreme Court's employment of
the misappropriation theory and the theory's interaction with
the SEC's rules combating fraudulent investment practices.
Part I of this Note reviews the development of the '34 Act, spe-
cifically, Rule 10b-5. Part II traces the Supreme Court's role in
the evolution of the misappropriation theory. Part III discusses
the potential pitfalls of the misappropriation theory, including
its inapplicability to the language and intent of the regulatory
tools, as well as its misapplication in United States v. O'Hagan.
Part IV offers potential remedies to facilitate criminal liability
under Rule 10b-5 without utilizing the misappropriation theory.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF SECURITIES REGULATION
The regulations implemented by the federal government 12 to
tion of fiduciary duty to its source); SEC v. Mayhew, 121 F.3d 44, 53 (2d Cir. 1997)
(explaining that information revealed by petitioner concerned tender offer, bringing him
under "in connection with" requirement of Rule 14(e)); SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 197
(2d Cir. 1984) (holding actions of employee in misappropriating confidential information
concerning tender offers trading fall within scope of securities laws); see also Marcy G.
Dworkin, The Misappropriation Theory as a Corollary to the Classic Insider Trading
Theory, 1996 ANN. SURv. AM. L. 315, 316 (1996) (explaining case by case analysis exists
for securities laws since no single standard governs when trading on inside information
violates these laws).
10 See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2202. The court articulated the means by which the
misappropriation theory may serve as a basis for criminal liability under Rule 10b-5. Id.;
SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 443 (9th Cir. 1990). The court set forth the elements of the
misappropriation theory, in the context of a Rule lob-5 violation. Id. The court stated:
Rule 10b-5 is violated [wihen a person (1) misappropriates material non-public in-
formation (2) by breaching a duty arising out of a relationship of trust and confidence
and (3) uses that information in a securities transaction, (4) regardless of whether he
owed any duties to the shareholders of the traded stock.
Id.
11 See 915 F.2d at 443 (describing function of regulatory tools for fraudulent investor
practices).
12 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1995). Section 10(b) gives the SEC the authority to pro-
scribe rules and regulations necessary to carry out anti-fraud provisions. Id. Rule lOb-5
extends anti-fraud regulation from just sellers under the 1934 Act, to encompass both
buyers and sellers of securities. Id.; see also Deborah A. Ballard, The Evolution of the
Government Business Relationship in the United States: Colonial Times to Present, 31
AM. BUS. L.J. 553, 620-21 (1994). Franklin D. Roosevelt's philosophy and approach to
governmental regulation of business involved an approach, where the federal govern-
ment played a primary role in directing and building the economy. Id. See generally Rob-
ert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation on Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1190
(1986). The 20th Century has witnessed a surge in the amount and variety of federal
regulations purposed to aid an ever-changing society. Id.
1998]
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combat the economic crisis of the early 20th century 13 continue
to play a pivotal role in the 1990's. After the stock market crash
of 1929,14 the securities market was in dire need of reform1 5 in
order to re-establish the free-market trading of securities. 16
While the securities industry began to re-establish itself by
raising substantial amounts of capital, the manner it which such
capital was generated was questionable. 17 The production of
capital via inequitable investing practices by select members of
the financial industry surfaced as a significant problem. 18
In order to curtail fraudulent activity, it was Congress' view
13 See generally Elisabeth Keller & Gregory A. Gehlmann, Introductory Comment: A
Historical Introduction to the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act
of 1934, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 329, 330 (1988) (describing evolution of regulatory tools); Rabin,
supra note 12, at 1189-90 (documenting need for regulatory measures).
14 See Joan K. Martin, Insider Trading and the Misappropriation Theory: Has the
Second Circuit Gone Too Far?, 61 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 78, 86 (1986) (examining applicabil-
ity of misappropriation theory (citing S. REP. No. 73-47, 6-7 (1933))); see also S. REP. No.
73-792, 3 (1934) (discussing implementation of anti-fraud regulatory devices); S. REP. NO.
73-1455, sl (1934) (explaining stock market fears of increased buying potential of market
traders).
15 See Naftalin & Co., Inc. v. Merril Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 469 F.2d
1166, 1180 (8th Cir. 1972) (articulating concern that regulations protect economy from
any severe dip in productivity); Moscarelli v. Stamm, 288 F. Supp. 453, 457 (E.D.N.Y.
1968) (explaining how 10b-5 was designed in post-1929 stock market crash economy to
curtail fraudulent investor practices); Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385, 407-08 (1990) (noting after
stock market crash, followed by depression of 1930's, public demanded Government con-
trol of securities trading).
16 See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 25 (1987) (elaborating on success of
financial industry); SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 450 n.21 (9th Cir. 1990) (describing pur-
pose of SEC Act of 1934); see also S. REP. No. 73-1455, Ch. 1, sl (1934) (seeking to create
"a justifiable belief that securities markets actually were 'free and open'). See generally
Dana Atwood Kukens, Regulation for the Securities Markets?, 10 ANN. REV. BANKING L.
379, 384 (1991) (stating that Congress regulated securities industry by reforming initial
offering of securities to public); Robert J. Malloy, Wargun Regulations: The Stock Market
Crash of 1987, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 693, 698-99 (1989) (articulating failed effort to control
financial markets via margin regulations).
17 See Keller & Gehlmann, supra note 13, at 330. In the decade after World War I,
$50 billion of new securities were circulating in the United States - an estimated half of
which were considered worthless because of the legislative belief of dishonest action by
industry members. Id.
18 See David Cowan Bayne, Insider Trading and the Misappropriation Theory: The
Awakening 1995, 30 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 487, 501 n.80 (1997). Issues of the constitutional-
ity of governmental action arguably served as the primary obstacle to any legislative ac-
tion during the administrations of Presidents Coolidge and Hoover. Id. Government at
this time was concerned with infringing upon state's powers granted under the 10th
Amendment. Id.; Michael R. Belknap, The New Deal and the Emergency Powers Doctrine,
62 TEX. L. REV. 67, 67 (1983). Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal allowed federal govern-
ment broad power over economic and social matters. Id. As a direct consequence of the
depressed economy, almost inevitably, the federal government increased its intervention.
Id. See generally Keller and Gehlmann, supra note 13, at 329. The economic crisis of the
1920's and condition in 1930's helped to motivate the government to enact legislation and
thereby, end years of laizzes-fair polity. Id.
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that anti-fraud provisions needed to be developed. 19 In addition
to several political and economic initiatives designed to invigo-
rate a stagnant economy, Franklin D. Roosevelt planned to pre-
vent fraudulent trading practices through government regulation
of the securities industry. 20 Upon his election, FDR acted
promptly 2' designating a commission 22 to develop regulations for
the financial community. 23
Along with the commission came the '34 Act which was de-
signed to regulate the process by which securities are offered and
sold to the public. 24 In 1942, the SEC exercised its discretionary
authority and promulgated Rule 10b-5. 25 Specifically, Rule 10b-
5 is equipped to work in conjunction with the boundaries of i-
ability that Section 10(b) is designed to protect. 26 The primary
19 See SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 201 (2d Cir. 1984) (noting extensive scope of
antifraud provision encompassed all manipulative and deceptive practices which have
been demonstrated to fulfill no useful function (quoting S. REP. No. 73-792, at 6 (1934)));
H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 2 (1933) (describing evolution and intent of governing anti-fraud
regulations); see also Matthew K. Fong, Disclosure Guidelines For Land - Based Securi-
ties, in CALIFORNIA DEBT ADVISORY COMMISSION AND STATE TREASURER ACTIONS 1997, at
835 (PLI Corp. L. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 7170, 1997); Harold Hangju Koh
and Joan Choon Yoo, Dollar Diplomacy/Dollar Defense: The Fabric of Economic and Na-
tional Security Law, 26 INT'L LAW. 715, 729-31 (1992) (showing how Congress hoped, by
delegating authority to President, economic measures would be enacted to rescue econ-
omy).
20 See Ballard, supra note 12, at 626-27 (stating depression from economy demanded
help from federal government). See generally ALAN BRENNLY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE
IDEA OF THE STATE IN THE RISE AND FALL OF THE NEW DEAL ORDER 188-90, n.86 (1989)
(stating FDR advocated strong role for federal government in regulation of economy).
21 See WILLIAM E. LUCHTENGERG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL, 175
(1963) (giving general theory of new deal and its programs).
22 See Bayne, supra note 18, at 489. Franklin D. Roosevelt named Felix Frankfuter,
his informal advisor, and lifelong friend to develop the SEC Act. Id. Frankfuter, along
with an elected three person panel, drafted the statute as we know it today. Id.
23 See id. at 489 n.123. The aforesaid panel utilized the British Companies Act of
1908 and 1929 as the theoretical model from which the SEC Act was derived. Id.; see also
Ginger E. Margolin, Securities-Fraud-Private Plaintiffs May Not Maintain Aiding and
Abetting Suits Under Securities Exchange Act Section 10(b) and Securities and Exchange
Commission Rule 10b-5, 26 ST. MART'S L.J. 601, 605-07 (1995). The intent behind the en-
actment of the 1933-1934 Acts was to maintain the integrity of the stock market and
thereby be worthy of public support. Id.
24 See Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 BuS. LAW. 793,
796 (1967) (enumerating specific functions of regulatory statute and regulation).
25 See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1998); see also In re Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C.
633, 641 n.18 (1971) (broadening Rule 10b-5's authority to "information [o]btained by in-
dustrial espionage, commercial bribery or the like"); Oliver Sandlin, Arbor Day for
"Judicial Oaks?": The Supreme Court Implies a Right to Contribution in Section 10(b)
Actions, 14 REV. LITIG. 289, 297-98 (1994) (stating Rule 10b-5 was promulgated by SEC
in accordance with powers allotted).
26 See United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2206 (1997) (documenting how li-
ability under Rule 10b-5, is limited by conduct parameters set forth in section 10(b)(quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 (1994))); see also Central Bank of
Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 173 (1994) (refusing
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focus of the drafters of Rule 10b-5 and Section 10(b),2 7 however,
remains to restore the standard of excellence which pervaded the
business community prior to the stock market crash of 1929.28
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY
A. Imposition of Liability Via "Duty to Disclose"
Initially, the development of liability under Rule 10b-5 began
when the standard of what constitutes a "duty to disclose" was
developed.29 This duty served as one of the primary determi-
nants of liability under the governing statute and regulation. 30
For example, in Cady, Roberts & Co, a securities broker traded
upon, without disclosing, material nonpublic information which
he received from a director of his corporation. 31 The SEC ruled
that an insider must abstain from trading shares of his corpora-
private challenges under 10b-5 which are outside scope of 10(b)).
27 See Shawn J. Lindquist, Note, United States v. O'Hagan: The Eighth Circuit
Throws the Second Strike to the Misappropriation Theory of Rule 1Ob-5 Liability, 1997
B.Y.U. L. REV. 197, 212 (1997) (enumerating pitfalls of misappropriation theory's apph-
cation to criminal liability); see also SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S.
180, 186 (1963) (designating underlying purpose of statute and regulation as to re-instill
high ethical standards).
28 See Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. at 186 (designating purpose of stat-
ute and regulation); Carlos J. Cuevas, The Misappropriation Theory and Rule 10b-5:
Deadlock in the Supreme Court, 13 J. CORP. L. 793, 795 (1988) (stating legislative aims of
Section 10(b) were: "(1) Designed to protect investors from fraudulent practices in the
securities market; and (2) Encourage rapid dissemination of financial information which
may have an impact on the value of a security").
29 See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 551 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing corporate
insiders as primary target of regulatory tool); Phillip Issen v. GSC Enter., 508 F. Supp.
1298, 1302 (N.D. ILL. 1984) (re-affirming duty to disclose standard); see also Dirks v.
SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 652 (1983) (noting affirmative duty to disclose on officers, directors or
controlling stock holders when dealing in securities); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S.
222, 226 (1980) (stating affirmative duty to disclose has been traditionally imposed on
corporate insiders); In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 910 (1961) (specifically,
Commission ruled that duty arises when there is relationship affording access to inside
information intended to be available only for corporate purpose); F. Arnold Daum &
Howard W. Philips, The Implications of Cady, Roberts, 17 Bus. LAW. 939, 939 (1962)
(examining evolution of duty to disclose).
30 See Securities Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (articulating regulatory securities
fraud provisions).
31 See United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685, 695 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (stating duty to
disclose or abstain arises only from relationship of trust and confidence); SEC v. Switzer,
590 F. Supp. 756, 765 (W.D. Okla. 1984) (discussing origin of duty to disclose); Schick v.
Steiger, 583 F.Supp 841, 846 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (elaborating as to what gives rise to duty
to disclose); Fiscner v. Kletz, 266 F.Supp 180, 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (stating that rationale
of Cady has often been followed by court in cases involving duty to disclose); In re Cady
Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 910 (1961) (explaining evolution of key elements of misap-
propriation theory).
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tion unless he first discloses all of the material information
known to him.32 Therefore, in order to prevent any deceptive
trading practices on behalf of those on the "inside", an affirma-
tive duty to disclose33 information evolved.
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfer Co.,34 also played a significant role in
the development of liability. The Second Circuit, in reversing
the lower court's dismissal, convicted a geologist who possessed
nonpublic information. 35 The Second Circuit expanded exposure
to liability, in order to rule within the confines of the statute.36
The court stated that in order to trade based upon material in-
side information the holder of such information must disclose it
to the investing public. 37 Texas Sulfer expanded the duty to dis-
close standard set forth in Cady3 8 by shifting the focus away
from strictly insiders. 39 Ultimately, Texas Sulfer served to im-
32 See Cady, 40 S.E.C. at 907 (requiring full disclosure).
33 See Chanoffv. United States Surgical Corp., 857 F. Supp. 1011, 1016 (D. Ct. 1994)
(discussing insider's duty to disclose may be preempted by federal securities laws which
proscribe such selective disclosure); SEC v. Fox, 654 F. Supp. 781, 790 (N.D. Tex. 1986)
(laying out duty to disclose or to abstain from trading); SEC v. Musella, 578 F. Supp. 425,
425 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (upholding bond traders duty to disclose before trading on informa-
tion); see also Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 650 (1983) (preventing insiders from illegally
appropriating information); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 224 (1980)
(elaborating on reasons for preventing insider trading); American General Ins. Co. v.
Equitable General Corp., 493 F. Supp. 721, 742 (E.D. Va. 1980) (explaining one who fails
to disclose commits fraud only when under duty to do so); Cady, 40 S.E.C. at 912
(elaborating on reasons for development of duty to disclose).
34 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968). See Barbara Bader Aldave, Misappropriation: A Gen-
eral Theory of Liability for Trading on Nonpublic Information, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 101,
105 (1984) (naming Texas Sulfer as subsequent case which Supreme Court approved in
Chiarella).
35 See Texas Gulf, 401 F.2d at 833. Specifically, a corporation, upon engaging in a
routine drilling for mineral deposits, discovered valuable mineral deposits. Id. The ge-
ologist was charged with and convicted of illegally trading the securities of the company
which had done the drilling. Id.
36 Id. at 976. The geologist was deemed by the Second Circuit to be an "insider",
more in accord with the statutory definition narrowing the broad standard articulated in
Cady. Id.; see also 18 DONALD C. LANGEWOORT, INSIDER TRADING: A TREATISE ON THE
DEFINITION, PREVENTION AND REGULATIONS OF INSIDER TRADING, § 2.02 (1998). The
author documents problems associated with insider trading and remedial measures that
may be taken. Id.; Sean P. Leuba, The Fourth Circuit Breaks Ranks in the U.S. v. Bryan:
Finally, a Repudiation of the Misappropriation Theory, 53 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1143,
1162 (1996). In Texas Gulf Sulfer, the U.S. Court of Appeals expanded policies and
guidelines set forth in Cady. Id.
37 See Texas Gulf, 401 F.2d at 848.
38 See Leuba, supra note 36, at 1160. The Texas Gulf Sulfer disclose or abstain the-
ory is justified on the theory that Rule lOb-5 required a parity of information. Id. It re-
quired equal access to corporate information, resulting in the generally accepted view
that any one in possession of material inside information must abstain from trading
while the information is undisclosed. Id.
39 See In re Cady Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 908 (1961). The duty to disclose ex-
panded to encompass individuals with special relationships with a company and privy to
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pose a duty on "anyone"40 who possesses and trades upon inside
information. Recently, however, this duty was narrowed to en-
compass only "corporate insiders. '4 1 Corporate insiders include
officers, directors, and shareholders of corporations, as well as
those possessing a fiduciary duty to the organization.
B. Classical Theory v. Advent of Misappropriation Theory of
Liability
Courts have held that unless a party maintains "corporate in-
sider" status there is no duty to disclose inside information im-
posed upon them. 42 For example, in Chiarella v. United States,43
because the petitioner was not an agent of the corporation he
worked for, he had no duty to disclose the inside information he
possessed.44 The Supreme Court held that a duty to disclose
arises from corporate insider relationships between parties and
not from the mere possession of market information. 45
While the majority interpreted the statute as requiring
"corporate insider"46 status in order to be subject to liability, the
dissenting opinion by Chief Justice Burger served as the genesis
of what the legal and financial communities have come to know
as the misappropriation theory.4 7 Citing the history and lan-
its internal affairs. Id. Once this relationship is uncovered certain duties are imposed
with respect to trading securities. Id.
40 See Wade M. Hall, Comment, Insider Trading Liability: Are We Ready to Leave the
Misappropriation Theory Quagmire?, 44 U. KAN. L. REV. 867, 894 (1996) (proposing al-
ternative ways in which criminal liability may be imposed under statutory tools).
41 See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 223 (1980) (focusing efforts of Rule
lob-5 to be more in accord with intent and language of statute).
42 See id. at 230. Corporate insiders deemed to be those officers, directors or share-
holders of a corporation involved with and/or privy to the infrastructure of the organiz-
tion. Id.
43 See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230.
44 See id. at 222. The petitioner had no affirmative duty to disclose what he had
learned as a result of his relationship with the companies upon which he traded. Id. He
was neither an agent, nor a trusted confidant, nor an employee, and thereby possessed
no duty to disclose any information to them under Section 10(b) of the SEC Act of 1934.
Id.
45 See id. at 230. The information upon which Chiarella relied and consequently
traded upon, involved only the plans of the acquiring company. Id. Since the information
was neither about the earning power, nor the operations of the organization, he did not
owe an affirmative duty to disclose to anyone. Id.
46 See id. (defining corporate insiders to include officers, directors, controlling share-
holders, and those who receive inside information from corporate insiders).
47 See id. at 240. Although the jury was never given the opportunity to hear it, the
dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Burger was one of the most significant the Supreme
Court has given. Id. From it, evolved the primary means by which criminal liability un-
der Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 would be determined for years to follow. Id. Beginning
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guage of the '34 Act, 48 Chief Justice Burger called for an ap-
proach that neither limits its application to strictly cases of cor-
porate insiders, nor to "deceptive practices related to 'corporate
information"'. 49 The misappropriation theory extends liability
beyond traditional corporate insiders to any lawful possessor of
material nonpublic information. 50 The Chief Justice rationalized
that the misappropriation theory will play a pivotal role in cur-
tailing deceptive trade practices, while adequately supporting
and facilitating the governing statute and rule. 51
Specifically, the misappropriation theory, as designed by Chief
Justice Burger, would impose liability for an individual who:
(1) Misappropriates nonpublic information (2) by breaching
a duty that arises out of trust and confidence and (3) uses
that information in a securities transaction (4) regardless of
whether he owed any duties to the shareholders of the
traded stock.52
The source of the nonpublic information does not in any way
with the general rule that "neither party to an arm's length business transaction has an
obligation to disclose information to the other .... " Burger rationalized that it allowed
for the effort and hard work of any business person to achieve success. Id. It permitted
for everything from intensive research to in-depth market analysis. Id. What it did not
allow for, however, was the attainment of information through an illegal means. Id. This
would create an unfair market advantage, and would not be tolerated. Id. Burger held
that a duty to disclose should be raised upon illegally obtaining information, and conse-
quently, when an individual misappropriates nonpublic information, they should have an
"absolute duty" to disclose that information. Id. Citing broad language, he holds that its
provisions are designed to reach "any" individual engaged in such illegal practice, re-
nouncing the belief that the statute was designed to reach only "corporate insiders." Id.
He supports this theory by distinguishing it through an analogy which states that by no
means could Congress have intended such a distinction to be drawn between "anyone"
and "insiders", the same way they could not have intended a "white collar" or "blue col-
lar" insider distinction. Id. The next section of the infamous dissent addresses the history
of the governing statute and rule. Id. Burger cites the primary intent of the statute to be
the termination of illegal, ill-intentioned securities trading on behalf of market members.
Id. at 241. Accordingly, an investor who conducts market transactions on the basis of
information he has illegally misappropriated, clearly falls within the aforesaid statutory
intentions. Id. This, Chief Justice Burger held, is an intelligent and logical match which
must carry our nation's economic arena into the future. Id. He accuses the Court of not
properly utilizing the misappropriation theory, as he herein has developed, and of not
aptly charging the jury as to the implications of it. Id. at 242. Specifically, Burger held
that the lack of jury instructions "possibly influenced the jury adversely to [the defen-
dant]" Id.
48 See id. at 241 (explaining how Burger reasoned misappropriation theory's applica-
tion to be in harmony with Rule lOb-5).
49 See id. (implementing broad statutory application).
50 See id. (documenting applicability of misappropriation theory).
51 See id. (elaborating on future of misappropriation theory in securities fraud cases).
52 See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 223 (1980) (enumerating elements of
misappropriation theory).
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have to be directly related to the securities transaction. 53 Addi-
tionally, the fraud requirement of Rule 10b-5 is fulfilled upon the
act of misappropriating the information from a person who has a
fiduciary relationship with a corporation. 54 The aforesaid fraud
is deemed to satisfy the "in connection with" language of the '34
Act when the information is utilized in a securities transaction. 55
The Supreme Court refused to adopt the misappropriation
theory in Chiarella,56 and continued to apply the "classical the-
ory" as the means by which to impose liability under the act.57
The classical theory requires the breach of a fiduciary duty by an
individual who buys or sells securities. 58 The offender must also
be trading securities of a corporation of which he/she is an in-
sider.59 The classical theory is in accordance with the statutory
language of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in that it requires the
fraud to be "in connection with the purchase or sale of any secu-
53 See Harry Weiss & Laura Walder, The Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trad-
ing Liability: The Supreme Court Grants the Government's Petition for Certiorari in U.S.
v. O'Hagan, in COPING WITH BROKER DEALER REGULATION AND INCREASING EN-
FORCEMENT 1997, at 37, 37 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B4-
7181, 1997) (analyzing characteristics and applicability of misappropriation theory); see
also SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 443 (9th Cir. 1990) (analyzing fiduciary relationship's
applicability to misappropriation theory).
54 See Weiss & Walder, supra note 53, at 37 (documenting evolution of fraud re-
quirement of misappropriation theory).
55 See id. at 37 (applying elements of misappropriation theory).
56 See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 222. The Supreme Court held that:
(1) employee could not be convicted on theory of failure to disclose his knowledge to
stockholders or target companies as he was under no duty to speak, in that he had
no prior dealings with the stockholders and was not their agent or fiduciary and was
not a person in whom sellers had placed their trust and confidence, but dealt with
them only through impersonal market transactions; (2) Section 10(b) duty to disclose
does not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market information; and (3)
court would not decide whether employee breached a duty to acquiring corporation
since such theory was not submitted t6 the jury.
Id.
57 See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227-30. The court held the elements of the classical the-
ory, constituted a Rule lob-5 violation when buyers/sellers of securities:
(i) owe a fiduciary or similar duty to the other party to the transaction; (ii) owe a fi-
duciary duty to the shareholders of the company in whose shares they are trading by
virtue of their position as an insider of the corporation; or (iii) are tippees who re-
ceived information from such an insider and know or should know that the insider
breached a fiduciary duty in giving the information.
Id.
58 See id. at 227; see also George Gabel, Who May Be Liable... 114 A.L.R. 323, 323
(1997) (explaining classical theory of insider trading); Joseph J. Humke, The Misappro-
priation Theory: Outside the Lines of Section 10 (b), 80 MARQ. L. REV. 819, 826 (1997)
(describing classical theory under Chiarella and Dirks); Lindquist, supra note 27, at 201
(describing in detail classical theory of liability).
59 See Lindquist, supra note 27, at 201 (explaining corporate insider status).
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rity",60 rather than the breach of a fiduciary duty, which may or
may not be connected with a securities transaction. 61
In Dirks v. SEC,62 the Supreme Court, while focused on the
corporate insider, expanded liability under Section 10(b) to apply
not simply to traditional insiders, but also to those possessing
merely temporary insider status.63 The appellant was deemed a
temporary insider by virtue of receiving information 64 from a
former client and employee of a firm who stated that the firm's
assets were grossly overstated.65 While Dirks never actually
traded on or profited from such information, 66 the fact that he
informed clients of the news caused the firm's stock to decline. 67
The Supreme Court upheld the court of appeals' decision con-
victing Dirks on the grounds that he had a duty to disclose such
information as he received it from a corporate insider.68 The
60 See 17 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1998) (exhibiting text of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5).
61 See id. (describing elements of statutory violation).
62 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
63 See id. at 655 (explaining how tippee breaches fiduciary duty assumed from in-
sider, when transmitting information to someone who will trade on basis thereof).
64 See id. at 646. Petitioner received information that documented corporate mal-
practice which severely overestimated corporate assets. Id. at 648-50. Although he openly
discussed his findings, senior management of the aforesaid corporations denied any
wrongdoing whatsoever. Id. Petitioner was confronted by a former officer of the corpora-
tion in question. Id. The officer disclosed to him, and at the same time urged Dirks to
disclose to the public, the fact that the corporations assets were overstated, and that
various regulatory agencies had conveniently failed to act on such charges. Id. Addi-
tionally, while conducting his investigation, Dirks kept a New York based Wall Street
Journalist abreast of his findings. Id. The journalist was hesitant, however, to publish
any report of the alleged wrongdoing, as the magnitude of such was uncanny. Id. He
eventually did publish the story upon the sudden stock price plunge and consequential
SEC investigation. Id. at 649.
65 See id. at 646. Dirks was employed at a firm which specialized in investment
analysis of insurance company securities to institutional investors. Id.
66 See id. 650. Despite never actually trading upon the information acquired, Dirks
was said to have "aided and abetted" various statutory violations, specifically section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Id. He was considered to have committed fraud upon other mem-
bers of the investment community who received and traded upon the information he of-
fered to them. Id. at 650-51.
67 See id. at 649-50 (providing statistical information regarding decrease in stock
price).
68 See id. at 659. The Supreme Court expanded the traditional notion of corporate
insider gleaned from Chiarella to include tippee's, temporary insiders, and buyers/sellers
of securities. Id. Specifically, the Supreme Court enumerates a duty in tippee's akin to
that of corporate insiders. Id. Holding that they receive the information which they trade
upon illegally, as do most insiders, a duty evolves to disclose it, not because of the nature
of the information, but because of the manner in which they received it. Id. at 660. Addi-
tionally, the court analyzed whether there is a breach of duty by carefully scrutinizing
the nature of the tip received. Id. Relevant inquiries involve the personal benefit received
by the insider as a result of the disclosure. Id. at 660-61. To determine whether a tippee
is under an obligation to disclose or abstain [from using nonpublic material information
from an insider], it is necessary to determine whether the insiders tip constituted a
19981
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delegation of a "temporary" insider status makes the classical
theory a more adaptive and effective tool with which liability
under Section 10(b) can be imposed.69 While expanding from a
traditional to temporary insider, the classical theory still im-
poses liability on parties directly involved in the securities
transaction. 70
III. WHY THE MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY IS NOT VALID
The misappropriation theory is becoming one of the primary
means by which liability is imposed under Rule 10b-5. 71 Until
United States v. O'Hagan,72 the Supreme Court was not faced
with the opportunity to determine the validity of the misappro-
priation theory as a means of liability. 73
In O'Hagan, the defendant was a partner in a law firm which
represented a corporation, Grand Metropolitan, regarding a po-
tential tender offer of Pillsbury. 74 While O'Hagan did not pos-
sess a direct relationship with Pillsbury, he did trade its stock.75
O'Hagan was consequently convicted of being privy to, trading
upon, and profiting from inside information gleaned from a rela-
tionship his firm shared with a client. 76 The Supreme Court
breach of the insider's fiduciary duty. Id. The test is whether the insider will benefit from
his disclosure. Id. Absent personal gain, there is no breach of duty to stockholders, and
without a breach by the insiders, there is no derivative breach. Id. at 662.
69 See William A. Snider, Securities Law - All in the Family - U.S. v. Chestman:
Finding a Fiduciary or other Similar Relation of Trust and Confidence under Rule 10b-5
For Family Members of a Family Controlled Publicly Traded Corporation, 16 W. NEW.
ENG. L. REV. 79, 83-84 (1994) (describing history of classical theory of insider trading li-
ability in two Supreme Court cases); see also Dworkin, supra note 9, at 322 (stating that
Dirks court extended liability to temporary insiders); Corey Smith, Extraterritorial En-
forcement of Rule 10b-5: Insider Trading in International Equities Market, 12 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 83, 91 (1988) (defining "temporary insiders").
70 See United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2207 (1997) (citing instances where
SEC does not exceed its rule-making authority); Copperweld Corp. v. Imetal, 403 F.
Supp. 579, 580 (W.D. Pa. 1975) (noting that SEC has broad rule-making authority).
71 See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 222 (1980) (explaining Chief Justice
Burger's reasoning); see also Barbara Finigan, To Catch a Thief, 70 MARQ. L. REV. 692,
704 (1987) (stating Chief Justice Burger was original proponent of misappropriation the-
ory); Christine Marra, The Misappropriation Theory, 24 U. RICH. L. REV. 211, 217 (1990)
(describing Chief Justice Burger's contribution to developing misappropriation theory);
Mellet, supra note 5, at 1062 (elaborating on Burger's arguments in Chiarella).
72 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997).
73 See id. at 2199 (evaluating appropriateness of misappropriation theory).
74 See id. at 2199 (reasoning how O'Hagan did not possess significant relationship
with client).
75 See id. (articulating innocent trading behavior of O'Hagan).
76 See id. (explaining relationship of O'Hagan, his firm, and firm's client).
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held the misappropriation theory as a valid means by which
criminal liability may be predicated under Rule 10b-5. 77 The
Court's use of the misappropriation theory as a means by which
criminal liability is established for securities fraud, must be re-
examined if it is to comport with Rule 10b-5.78
In O'Hagan, the Chief Justice, and Justices Scalia and Thomas
dissented from the majority's imposition of criminal liability un-
der Rule 10b-5. 79 Their primary argument focuses on the mis-
appropriation theory's inability to comport with the "in connec-
tion with"80 language of the statute. 81 The dissenting Justices
77 See id. (finding criminal liability under misappropriation theory); see also Richard
Phillips, The Supreme Court's Decision in O'Hagan: A Choice of Judicial Pragmatism
over Ideology, in SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTE: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO IN-
VESTIGATION, SETTLEMENT & LITIGATION 1997, at 237, 248 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice
Course Handbook Series No. B4-7240, 1997) (describing Eighth Circuit's decision in
O'Hagan); Bruce Hiter, United States v. O'Hagan, 11 No. 9 INSIGHTS 2, 3 (1997)
(explaining Supreme Court's analysis in O'Hagan).
78 See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2207. "The misappropriation theory is thus designed to
protect the integrity of the securities markets against abuses by 'outsiders' to a corpora-
tion who have access to confidential information that will affect the corporations security
price when revealed..." Id.
79 See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2220 (reasoning that section 10(b) and Rule lob-5 do
... not seem to accord with the principle of lenity we apply to criminal statutes"); see
also Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 64-65 (1995) (documenting aforesaid principles of crimi-
nal lenity); United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 570 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating that
more than "perfunctory need" of rule of lenity is required for a Rule lob-5 criminal con-
viction). See generally Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 427 (1985) (stating that
application of rule of lenity strikes appropriate balance between legislature, prosecutor
and court); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347-48 (1971) (expounding on policies of
criminal lenity).
80 See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2222-23. The dissent completely disassociates itself
from the majority's viewpoint of the "in connection with" language. Id. They refer to the
misappropriation theory as:
[t]hat theory should no longer cover cases, such as this one, involving [Information
where the source has no connection with the other participant in a securities trans-
action [i]t seems obvious that the undisclosed information is not necessarily con-
summated by a securities transaction.
Id. at 2223. See generally SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 448 (9th Cir. 1990). The court
states that fraudulent "practices merely have to be 'in connection with' security pur-
chases or sales." Id.; United States v. Elliot, 711 F.Supp 425, 431 (N.D. Ill. 1989). "[T]he
statute's language broadly prohibits 'in connection with the purchase or sale of any secu-
rity'." Id.
81 See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2220-21; see also Timothy J. Horman, In Defense of
U.S. v. Bryan: Why the Misappropriation Theory is Indefensible, 64 FORDHAM L. REV.
2455, 2506 (1996). "The misappropriation theory fails to meet the 'in connection with' re-
quirement of Section 10(b)." Id.; Jay G. Merwin, Jr., Misappropriation Theory Liability
Awaits a Clear Signal, 51 BUS. LAW. 803, 805 (1996). After fifteen years of finding civil
and criminal liability under the misappropriation theory, the courts have still yet to de-
fine the range of relationship whose breach can generate a duty to disclose. Id. But see
William R. Lucas & Alma M. Angotti, Insider Trading: Is it Back or Did it Ever Really Go
Away?, 9 NO. 10 INSIGHTS 2, 8 (1995). The rejection of the misappropriation theory would
create a gaping hole in the rules and may leave open the possibility that people could
easily commit fraud in connection with their securities transactions. Id.
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urge a reversion to the classical theory of predicating criminal
liability under Rule 10b-5.82 The classical theory is a more ap-
propriate means of liability, focusing on those who possess a di-
rect relationship8 3 between the alleged fraud and the securities
transaction. 84 The '34 Act, therefore, must be strictly construed
in order to keep with the overall legislative goal of curtailing il-
legal trading activity of corporate insiders in the securities mar-
ket.85
The language of the '34 Act unambiguously requires that the
imposition of criminal liability be limited to corporate insiders
who misappropriate material, nonpublic information in connec-
tion with a securities transaction. 86 The misappropriation the-
ory, however, imposes criminal liability for the breach of a fidu-
ciary duty, irrespective of whether the breach was in connection
with a securities transaction.8 7 The intent of the legislature in
drafting the '34 Act focuses on apprehending corporate insiders
engaged in deceptive trading practices. 88 The misappropriation
82 See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2219 (explaining why classical theory is preferred
means to impose criminal liability).
83 See id. at 2221 (discouraging use of misappropriation theory because of its overly
expansive construction; urging more integral connection between fraud and securities
transaction); see also Christopher J. Muzzi, The Misappropriation Theory: Over Extension
of Liability in Section 10(b) Causes of Action, 101 DICK. L. REV. 515, 519 (1997) (stating
that rejection of misappropriation theory fits Supreme Court trend of strictly interpret-
ing federal securities regulations); Peter Shapiro, Caveat Employer? Can Alleged Victims
of Insider Trading Scandals Recover Damages From an Employer for the Illegal Dealings
of an Employee, 38 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1045, 1067 (1987) (discussing contention that mis-
appropriation theory circumvents "in connection with" language of statute). But see War-
ren Toelk La Zarow, The SEC's Regulation of the Financial Press: The Legal Implications
of the Misappropriation Theory, 52 BROOK. L. REV. 43, 71 (1986) (explaining that misap-
propriation theory fits well within judicial activist point of view taken with respect to
Rule 10b-5 liability).
84 See Douglas Hunt & Michael R. Seyle, Carpenter v. United States : Securities
Trading, Mail Fraud and Confidential Business Information - New Liability for Outsid-
ers?, 20 PAC. L.J. 839, 845 (1989). "[T]he misappropriation theory represents a significant
departure from early 10b-5 liability analysis because it focuses upon the employee's fi-
duciary duty to an employer instead of upon the duty owed to the shareholder's of the
corporation." Id. See generally Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 410, 412 (1997). This article analyzes the potential weaknesses of the misappro-
priation theory and why it should no longer be applied. Id.; David Bayne, Insider Trad-
ing: The Demise of the Misappropriation Theory and Thereafter, 41 ST. Louis U. L.J. 625,
642 (1997). The author advocates numerous reasons why the classical, not the misappro-
priation theory is more in accord with the statutory goals and language. Id.
85 See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2199 (dissenting opinion by Scalia calling for lenity of
interpretation of criminal statutes).
86 See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1998) (describing text of statute).
87 See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 222 (documenting why misappropriation theory is not
applicable).
88 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 73-152, at 152 (1933) (discussing particular transactions
statute is designed to combat); Scott J. Davis & Joseph A. Starkman, Liability Under
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theory seemingly imposes criminal liability upon individuals
outside the scope of corporate insiders. While it is important
that all deceptive trade practices are properly governed, the '34
Act is designed only to apprehend the illegal activity of corporate
insiders.8 9
A. The Classical Theory of Liability - A Theory Better Suited to
Impose Liability Under the '34 Act and Rule 10b-5
A more conventional and appropriate measure upon which
criminal liability for securities fraud may be predicated is the
classical theory. 90 In applying the classical theory, the courts fo-
cus primarily upon the "in connection with" language of the stat-
ute. 9 1 The classical theory requires a nexus between the breach
of a fiduciary duty by an insider and the shareholder with whom
the insider transacts, thereby limiting the imposition of criminal
liability to only corporate insiders.92 The misappropriation the-
Section 10, 18 and 20 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, in UNDERSTANDING THE
SECURITIES LAWS 1996, at 703, 709 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series No.
B4-7120, 1996) (describing scope of Rule lOb-5 protecting both purchasers and sellers of
securities); see also Brandon Becker et al, Selected Issues In the Regulation of Fixed In-
come Securities, in BROKER - DEALER REGULATION 1993, at 1, 45 (ALI-ABA Course of
Study, 1993) (stating insider trading exists when material, nonpublic information is used
to purchase or sell securities); Daniel P. Cunningham, Insider Trading and Debt Securi-
ties, in 23RD ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 1991, at 11, 13 (PLI Corp. L.
& Practice Course Handbook Series No. B4-6978, 1991) (stating Rule 10b-5 applies to
activities undertaken in connection with purchase or sale of security).
89 See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (illustrating elements of misappropriation theory).
90 See Troy Cichos, The Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading: Its Past, Pres-
ent, and Future, 18 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 389, 419-20 (1995). The author states that a new
set of regulations should be adopted to fill the holes within the misappropriation theory.
Id.; Jill E. Fisch, Start Making Sense: An Analysis and Proposal for Insider Trading
Regulation, 26 GA. L. REV. 179, 187 (1991). The author discusses the history behind the
alternative, classical insider trading theory. Id.; Michael P. Kenny & Theresa D. The-
baut, Misguided Statutory Construction to Cover the Corporate Universe: The Misappro-
priation Theory of Section 10(b), 59 ALB. L. REV. 139, 182 (1995). Under the classical the-
ory, liability for insider trading may be imposed upon a person who, without disclosing,
uses material, nonpublic information to trade in securities. Id.
91 See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); see also William S. Lerach, Private Securities Litigation Re-
turn Act of 1995 - 20 Months Later, Securities Class Action Litigation Under the Private
Securities Return Act, "A Brave New World" in SECURITIES LITIGATION 1997, at 9, 59
(PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B4-7199, 1997) (enumerating ap-
plicability of classical theory to statutory language); Richard M. Phillips & Michael B.
Avon, The Supreme Court's Decision in O'Hagan' A Choice of Judicial Pragmatism over
Ideology, in SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTE: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO INVESTI.
GATION, SETTLEMENT & LITIGATION 1997, at 237, 240 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course
Handbook Series No. B4-7240, 1997) (reaffirming that classical theory does not apply to
outsiders who trade material non-public information).
92 See James J. Armstrong et al., Securities Fraud, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 973, 984
(1996) (stating that under classical theory, liability for illegal trading falls upon
"corporate insiders"); Barbara Rudolph, Subjective Evaluations of Technology as Basis for
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ory, conversely, imposes criminal liability upon everyone related
to the securities transaction, irrespective of the degree to which
a party may be removed from the inside information. 93 There-
fore, the classical theory is a more effective means to impose
Rule 10b-5 criminal liability, and to protect the financial indus-
try from deceptive corporate insider trading practices.
B. The Misappropriation Theory Does Not Comport with the
Language of the '34 Act
By imposing criminal liability upon an individual who
breaches simply any fiduciary duty, the misappropriation theory
completely disregards the language in the '34 Act. The '34 Act
requires alleged fraudulent activity to be "in connection with" or
"related to" securities transactions. 94  In order to bring a 10b-5
suit, the statute demands that the source of the information be
either a purchaser or seller of securities or affiliated with the
purchase or sale of securities. 95 Only these aforementioned par-
ties may be subject to liability under the classical theory. 96 Un-
der the misappropriation theory, however, the focus is on "fraud
on the source" with respect to the imposition of liability. 97 In
Rule 10b-5 Securities Law Violations: Liability for Scientific Consultants, 61 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1856, 1862 (1993) (explaining classical theory of insider trading liability); see also
R. Rene Pengra, Insider Trading, Debt Securities, and Rule 10b-5: Evaluating the Fidu-
ciary Relationship, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1354, 1401 n26 (1992) (stating that traditional in-
sider trading law requires showing of fiduciary relationship, which is often difficult).
93 See Kenny & Thebault, supra note 90, at 141 (analyzing potential dangers of ap-
plying misappropriation theory to all investors).
94 See id. at 141 (stating because of vague standards in misappropriation theory,
normal market behavior may be swept up in financial unfairness dragnet); see also
United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 935 (4th Cir. 1995) (discussing misappropriation
theory as too vague to be encompassed in Section 10(b)); cf. Christine Marra, The Misap-
propriation Theory: A Practical Means of Imposing Rule 10b-5 Liability, 24 U. RICH. L.
REV. 211, 214 (1990) (explaining misappropriation theory to be superior means of imple-
menting policy goals of Rule lOb-5).
95 See Santa Fe Indus., Inc., v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476-77 (1977) (describing the
act, its "fbroad congressional purpose [t]o protect investors from false and misleading
practices that might injure them"); see also Harvey L. Pitt et. al., Talking the Talk and
Walking the Walk: Director Duties to Uncover and Respond to Management Misconduct,
in ADVANCED SECURITIES LAW WORKSHOP 1997, at 301, 306 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice
Course Handbook Series No. B4-7209, 1997) (enumerating preventive measures to be
taken to combat fraudulent trading practices); Bayne, supra note 18, at 520 (stating
"[tihe wording of 10(b), making fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of a secu-
rity a violation of the Act, is surely badly stretched when construed to provide a cause of
action, not to purchasers and sellers of securities, but the world at large").
96 See Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 476 (enumerating who has standing).
97 See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 233-34 (1980) (stating "[s]uch a gen-
eral fraud-on-the-source theory in pursuit of the same parity of information cannot be
defended). See generally John L. Latham & Jenna L. Fruechtenicht, Securities Regula-
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other words, a plaintiff need only establish fraud, irrespective of
its connection with the securities transaction, in order to bring a
Rule 10b-5 claim. 98
The misappropriation theory exceeds the corporate insider
scope of the regulatory statutes by imposing criminal liability
upon everyone associated with the transaction. 99 Consequently,
although criminal liability may correctly be imposed upon a cor-
porate insider, it may also be incorrectly applied to apprehend an
individual whom Rule 10b-5 is not designed to govern. 100 Prob-
lems arise from the lack of clarity with respect to the definition
of the source of the nonpublic information, therefore, allowing
unintended parties to be found liable.
The aforementioned problem is evident in the '34 Act which is
narrowly worded to impose criminal liability upon a limited
group of security traders, the corporate insider. 101 While other
regulations may address those who are not corporate insiders
the '34 Act remains narrow in its scope, exemplified by the stat-
tion, 48 MERCER L. REV. 1677, 1724 (1996) (deciphering application of misappropriation
theory).
98 See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 567 (2d Cir. 1991) (proposing after
Carpenter, fiduciary relationship changes); see also Melina Cain, Corporate Law - Securi-
ties Fraud - Impact of In Re Time Warner on Corporate Business Strategy May Give Rise
to Disclose an Alternate Strategy Under Rule 10b-5, 355 TEX. L. REV. 753, 757 (1994)
(analyzing Rule 10b-5); Richard Painter & Jennifer Duggan, Lawyer Disclosure of Corpo-
rate Fraud: Establishing a Firm Foundation, 50 SMU L. REV. 225, 230 (1996)
(differentiating Rule 10b-5 from Rule 11).
99 See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, at 234-35 (1980) (explaining inappli-
cability of misappropriation theory to securities fraud cases); Natowitz v. Mehlman, 567
F. Supp. 942, 945 (S.D.N.Y 1983) (refusing to consider SEC transaction integral or help-
ful to fraudulent scheme so as to be under statute). See generally In re Financial Corp. of
Am. v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 796 F.2d 1126, 1129 (9th Cir. 1986) (explaining that in-
terpretation of Supreme Court takes on paramount importance because of statutes broad
language); Kenny & Thebault, supra note 90, at 141 (calling for higher degree of concen-
tration on corporate insiders).
100 See Sante Fe., 430 U.S. at 463 (noting provision is concerned with fairness of con-
duct toward persons such as family members, employers, or parties to infinite number of
similar trust relationships who are not in any way connected with or even interested in
purchase or sale of securities); see also Bayne, supra note 84, at 636 (discussing misap-
propriation theory and buyers/sellers role in it); Phillips & Avon, supra note 91, at 250
(enumerating Courts rejection of position of Eighth Circuit holding Rule lOb-5 only to
cover deception of purchasers and sellers of securities).
101 See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983) (articulating how corporate in-
sider status extends to officers, directors and permanent insiders of corporations); Milton
Freeman, Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 BUS. LAW. 793,
922 (1967) (documenting evolution of Rule lOb-5); Herbert T. Krimmel, Note, The Gov-
ernment Insider and Rule lob-5: A New Application for an Expanding Doctrine, 47 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1491, 1498-1502 (1974) (stating lob-5 imposes liability only upon narrow
group of people, corporate insiders); see also Arthur Fliescher, Jr. et al., An Initial In-
quiry into the Responsibility to Disclose Market Information, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 798, 799
(1973) (focusing on corporate insider disclosure requirements).
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ute's legislative history. 102 If the legislature wished to condemn
those individuals who possess inside information, but who are
not privy to the securities transaction, it appears that additional
legislation would have been adopted.
Proponents of the misappropriation theory argue that it does
in fact encompass the requisite deception language that the
statute requires. 103 Arguably, the misappropriation theory may
be a valid basis upon which liability may be predicated if decep-
tion, breach of a fiduciary duty, and a securities transaction are
all present. There is a problem, however, when no correlation
exists between the breach of a fiduciary duty, the deception, and
the securities transaction. 10 4 Deception alone, for example, does
not satisfy the statute's requirements. 10 5 Proponents of the mis-
appropriation theory argue that even if deception is remotely
connected with a securities transaction, it may in and of itself,
satisfy the "in connection with" statutory language. 10 6 This
could result in liability being imposed upon individuals who are
neither directly involved with the transaction, nor have breached
a fiduciary duty. 107 O'Hagan exemplifies this problem by impos-
ing liability upon a person who had no fiduciary duty and who
102 See Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 173
(1994). There is a "[v]iolation only when there is intentional or willful conduct designed
to deceive or defraud investors." Id.; see also Martha L. Cochran, Litigating and BeSpeak-
ing Caution Under the New Securities Law, in SWEEPING REFORM 1996, at 31, 34 (PLI
Corp. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B4-7152, 1996). Rule lob-5 is used for
private actions, however, it is under debate whether it is available for recklessness. Id.
103 See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 10 (1971).
The court looks to misappropriation theory as fulfilling deception requirement of statute,
but at the same time, disregards "in connection with" statutory language. Id.; see also
Humke, supra note 58, at 841. "Indeed, the necessity for misappropriation liability may
be exaggerated. Chiarella and Dirks established an ambit of prohibited conduct within
which the vast majority of Section 10(b) offenses hitherto prosecuted have fallen." Id.;
Michael J. Voves, United States v. O'Hagan: Improperly Incorporating Common Law and
Fiduciary Obligations into Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act, 81 MINN. L. REV.
1015, 1017 (1997). The primary focus is to exhibit lack of fiduciary relationships pos-
sessed by most insiders. Id.
104 See United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2220 (1997). Justice Thomas' dis-
sent calls for the touchstone requirement of statutory language to be "necessarily and
only consummated by the transaction, not that it merely coincide with the transaction"
Id.
105 See id. at 2220 (promoting theory that more aptly focuses on corporate insider).
106 See Head v. Head, 759 F.2d 1172, 1175 (4th Cir. 1985) (citation omitted) (noting
'de minimis touch test' might make any securities transaction actionable under Rule lob-
5). But see Britt v. Cyril Bath Company, 417 F.2d. 433, 440 (6th Cir. 1969) (noting that
even though language is broad, casual connection must still be made for common "in
connection with" language).
107 See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664 n.24 (1983) (explaining how without clearly
defined rules, investors find themselves targets of ad hoc decision-making).
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did not deceive or defraud any market participant in his securi-
ties transactions. 108
C. The Legislative Intent
The drafters of the '34 Act intended to focus specifically on in-
formation misappropriated by corporate insiders who owed a fi-
duciary duty to parties in connection with securities transac-
tions. 109 It is the court's responsibility, therefore, to carryout
the Act's purpose by focusing primarily on corporate insiders. 110
It seems as though there must be a degree of removal designa-
tion, or a proverbial line drawn, to prevent the imposition of
criminal liability outside the scope of the '34 Act.
1. Manipulative and Fraudulent Securities Trading
The governing statute and regulation seek to hold corporate
insiders liable for manipulative and fraudulent securities trading
activity. 111 Criminal liability based upon Rule 10b-5 is properly
premised upon the fraudulent breach of a duty which is directly
involved with the buying or selling of securities. 112 The misap-
propriation theory, however, instills liability based upon the
breach of any duty, irrespective of its relation to the securities
108 See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2199 (stating innocence of O'Hagan's securities trans-
actions); United States v. Charney, 537 F.2d 341, 357 (9th Cir. 1976) (arguing that mar-
ket manipulation should be keyed upon for purposes of stock market fraud).
109 See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1998); see also Theresa Gabardon, State Answers to Fed-
eral Questions: The Common Law of Federal Securities Regulation, 20 J. CORP. L. 155,
198 (1995) (discussing legislative history of insider trading and statutes pertaining to it);
James Kehoe, Exporting Insider Trading Laws: The Enforcement of U.S. Insider Trading
Laws Internationally, 9 EMORY INVL L. REV. 345, 348 (1995) (defining "insider" and its
intended role in insider trading); Jeffrey Snarchy, Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank:
Will the Death of a Salesman Stop the Selling?, 26 U. TOL. L. REV. 695, 713 (1995)
(discussing several Supreme Court interpretations of insider trading and Rule 10b-5).
110 See SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 441 (9th Cir. 1990). According to the legislative
history supporting two modern-day regulatory acts, the applicability of Section 10(b) and
Rule lob-5 are affirmed. Id. Specifically, with the Insider Trading Sanctions Act ('ITSA")
of 1984, Congress re-affirmed the power vested in the SEC to impose penalties on those
who trade on material, nonpublic information. Id. Congress also considered expressly
defining "Insider Trading", but opted not to, as it presented too great a challenge. Id.; see
also Karl Groskaufmanis, The SEC's Enforcement Nose Dive, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 16,
1991, at 21-22 (articulating concerns of Congress regarding expressly defining "insider
trading").
lll See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (articulating words of statute).
112 See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 723 (1975) (holding
respondent was not entitled to sue for violation of Rule lOb-5); SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d
439, 448 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating how any person or either side of transaction could vio-
late fiduciary duty); SEC v. Singer, 786 F. Supp. 1158, 1163 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (describing
fiduciary relationship as one of trust and confidence).
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transaction. 113 The misappropriation theory incorrectly allows
for criminal liability to evolve from a breach of a fiduciary duty
by a corporate "outsider", not to the trading party, but to the
source of the information. 114 This breach of a fiduciary obliga-
tion, absent the requisite fraudulent intent and deceit, may not
constitute a violation under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.115
In order to comply with the requirement of manipulative and
fraudulent securities trading, courts have recognized the "silent
transaction".116 In other words, mere inaction by a person in
possession of inside information may qualify as a transaction in
order to impose liability. Such silence, however, must be coupled
with the requisite duty to disclose. 117 This duty to disclose was
not present in O'Hagan, yet liability was inexplicably found un-
der the misappropriation theory with only the "silent transac-
tion" as a basis for the conviction.
2. "In Connection With"
The intent of the federal standards set forth is to focus on the
breach of a fiduciary relationship connected with a securities
transaction. 118 The misappropriation theory, however, attempts
113 See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Greene, 430 U.S. 462, 465 (1977) (holding transaction
that was neither deceptive nor manipulative did not violate either Section 10(b) or Rule
10b-5); SEC v. Maio, 51 F.3d 623, 626 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting that one does not have to be
"insider" to breach fiduciary duty); SEC v. Musella, 578 F. Supp. 425, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)
(outlining why liability rests solely upon whether fiduciary relationship has been cre-
ated).
114 See Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 733 n.5.
The wording of 10(b), making fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of a se-
curity a violation of the act, is surely badly strained when construed to provide a
cause of action, not to purchasers and sellers of securities, but to the world at large."
Id.; see also Shawnut Bank v. Kress Assoc., 33 F.3d 1396, 1452 (3rd Cir. 1994) (noting
that fiduciary question essential to this case must be met before proceeding); Frain v.
Frain, Inc., 660 F.Supp. 97, 103 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (enumerating plaintiff as having burden
of proving fiduciary relationship exists under 10(b) claim).
115 See Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 733 (claiming how misappropriation theory may not
impose criminal liability on entire financial world).
116 See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 229 (1980). The problem with this
argument is that liability based upon silence is premised on a duty to disclose which
arises from a fiduciary relationship between parties. Id.
117 See id. at 226 (ruling that silence in and of itself may not constitute violation un-
der lOb-5).
118 See United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2224 n.2 (1997).
[e]ven if O'Hagan or someone else thereafter used the information to trade, the mis-
appropriation would have been complete before the trade and there should be no
Section 10(b) liability. The most obvious real-world example of this scenario would be
if O'Hagan had simply tipped someone else to the information. The mere act of
passing the information along would have violated O'Hagan's fiduciary duty... re-
gardless of whether the tippee later traded on the information.
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to impose liability without addressing the "in connection with"
language of the governing statute and regulation. 119 As a result,
courts may impose liability, using the misappropriation theory,
upon people having no connection or duty to the institution for
whom the information pertains, but who inadvertently pick upon
inside information. The misappropriation theory, therefore, is
inconsistent with the legislative intent of Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5120 because it fails to focus on an insiders duty to the issu-
ing shareholders of a company in connection with a securities
transaction. 12 1
IV. PROPOSED REMEDIES
The courts should digress from the misappropriation theory,
and utilize the classical theory for future review of fraudulent
practices. 122 The classical theory is more in accord with the
goals of the '34 Act, however, so long as it remains available
only on a theoretical basis it will be continually scrutinized by its
Id. See generally Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 646 (1983). A connection to a securities
transaction must exist in order to impose liability under lob-5. Id.; United States v.
Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 551 (2d Cir. 1991). There must be a breach of duty and use of
information in securities transactions. Id. But see United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12,
18 (2d Cir. 1981). It does not matter for purposes of liability whether a recipient of infor-
mation is actually trading in securities. Id.
119 See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2225. The goals of the theory are: "[mlaintaining fair
and honest markets, promoting investor confidence, and protecting the integrity of the
securities market." Id.; see also John F. Seegal, Liabilities in Initial Public Offerings, in
HOW TO PREPARE AN INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERING 1996, at 193, 195 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice
Course Handbook Series No. B4-7151, 1996). "Purpose of civil liability provisions of fed-
eral securities laws is to provide an incentive for full disclosure." Id. See generally Jill E.
Fisch, Imprudent Power: Reconsidering U.S. Regulation of Foreign Tender Offers, 89 NW.
U. L. REV. 523, 523 (1995). "Primary purpose of Act is to protect investors in connection
with tender offer." Id.
120 See SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 403 (7th Cir. 1991). The court ruled that a per-
son violates Rule lOb-5 and Section 10(b) by misappropriating and trading upon material
information entrusted to him by virtue of a fiduciary relationship such as employment.
Id.; SEC v. Willis, 797 F. Supp. 165, 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). The district court stated cause
of action existed against broker for securities fraud based on misappropriation theory.
Id.; United States v. Winanc, 612 F. Supp. 827, 827 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). The court said the
misappropriation theory of liability for securities and mail fraud was an applicable basis
for convictions of a reporter and investor engaged in a fraudulent scheme. Id.
121 See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 222. The misappropriation theory imposes liability for
an individual who:
(1) Misappropriates nonpublic information (2) by breaching a duty that arises out of
trust and confidence and (3) uses that information in a securities transaction, (4) re-
gardless of whether he owed any duties to the shareholders of the traded stock.
Id.
122 See O'Hagan, 117 S.Ct. at 2202. "Under the 'classical theory' there is a
[r]elationship of trust and confidence between the corporation's shareholders and the in-
sider that gives rise to a duty to disclose or abstain from trading." Id.
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users. The courts should utilize strict scrutiny when interpret-
ing the words of the '34 Act. Such careful consideration of the
Act's meaning will ensure the apprehension of corporate insiders
who improperly misappropriate nonpublic information.
While the misappropriation and classical theories present dif-
ferent standards, they both attempt to prevent fraudulent secu-
rities trading. 123 Legislation should be developed which encom-
passes corporate insiders and all others that engage in deceptive
trading practices. Such legislation may, in fact, serve to protect
investors from illegal trading practices by both the corporate in-
sider and those who possess no insider relationship to the traded
securities at all.
Theories work on a debatable level, but are left open to scru-
tiny which may facilitate their premature demise. Therefore, the
application of the classical theory to facilitate the '34 Act, may
potentially create ambiguities, absent specific regulatory lan-
guage that recognizes the role that the classical theory will play.
In other words, in order to be truly effective, the legislature must
directly articulate the behavior that the classical theory is spe-
cifically designed to combat. 124 Once specific language is drafted
on how, when, and why the classical theory will aid the '34 Act in
combating deceptive trading practices, a strict scrutiny analysis
should be employed by regulatory commissions and judges. Such
careful consideration of the application of the classical theory
would effectively and efficiently achieve justice, punishing those
offenders the statute's drafters originally intended to target.
CONCLUSION
The recent Supreme Court decision supporting the misappro-
priation theory is in contrast with the goals, standards, and in-
tent of the governing federal statute and regulation. Reversing
the applicability of the misappropriation theory is essential to
carrying out the intent of the '34 Act, to punish corporate insid-
123 See id. at 2199 (explaining how primary focus of Supreme Court is to apprehend
violators of securities fraud).
124 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1998). The SEC has the rule-making authority to pro-
vide the means it deems necessary to achieve the ends of Section 10(b). Id. It promul-
gated Rule lOb-5 in this manner. Id. Why not codify the classical theory so as to elimi-
nate any doubt as to which theory is to be used? Id. See generally Huddleston v. Maclean,
640 F.2d 534, 543 (5th Cir. 1981). There is a need for clarification of Section 10(b). Id.
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ers for fraudulent securities trading.
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